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FATAL FLAW: FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PERSONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF A PERSON WITH A DISABILITY
Annette Bulger Mathis*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001 the Supreme Court of the United States in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin1
held that professional golf tournaments are places of public accommodation, and,
therefore, sponsors have a duty to perform an individualized inquiry to determine
whether a modification sought by a professional golfer with a disability is (1)
reasonable, (2) necessary, and (3) not a fundamental alteration. To refuse to
engage in this individualized inquiry is a fatal flaw in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).'
This Note will examine the ADA and case law in an attempt to determine the
duty owed by a private entity operating a place of public accommodation to a
person with a disability who is seeking accommodation. Part II of this Note will
address the ADA and the supporting case law defining public accommodation
and the mandated individualized inquiry. Part III will discuss the Martin case.
Part IV will analyze the majority and dissenting opinions in light of the plain lan-
guage and purpose of the ADA and the supporting case law. Part V will discuss
the propriety of the holding in Martin and its possible impact on persons with
disabilities and on society as a whole.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The ADA is an outgrowth of the Rehabilitation Act of 19733 The Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973' applies to federal entities and entities with connections to the
federal government.' It prohibits federal entities, federally funded programs, and
entities that contract with the federal government from discriminating against
persons with disabilities.6 In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA extending this
prohibition of discrimination to reach private entities that have no connections to
the federal government.7
* The author thanks Professor Judith Johnson for going beyond the call of duty in assisting with the
revising of this Note and for offering an objective opinion. The author also thanks Professor Lee Hetherington,
a great professor and motivator.
1. PGA Tours, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12182 (1994).
3. Michael waterstone, Let s Be Reasonable Here: Why the ADA Will Not Ruin Professional Sports,
2000 BYU L. Rav. 1489, 1495 (2000) (stating that "[t]he ADA was not drawn on a blank canvas. Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, enacted in 1979, prohibits federal agencies and employers that receive federal funds
from discriminating against applicants or employees with disabilities").
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1994).
5. Waterstone, supra note 3, at 1495.
6. Julie L. Livergood, Note, Walking with Tradition v. Riding into Tomorrow: Olinger v. United States
GolfAssociation, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 125, 129 (2001) (stating that "the reach of the Rehabilitation Act's cover-
age was limited to federal agencies, federally funded programs, or contracts with the federal government; there-
fore, the majority of private sector employees and users of private sector facilities could not benefit from the
law's proscriptions").
7. Paul V Sullivan, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Analysis of Title III and
Applicable Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1117, 1120 (1995) (stating that "[i]n enacting the ADA, Congress
provided protection for disabled individuals beyond what the Rehabilitation Act already provided");
Waterstone, supra note 3, at 1496 (stating that "[a] key rationale used to support the ADA was that it essentially
extended an existing federal statute into the private sector").
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Congress found that society has a tendency to isolate, segregate, restrict, and
limit persons with disabilities "based on characteristics that are beyond the con-
trol of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and con-
tribute to, society."8 Therefore, Congress enacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 to end discrimination against persons with disabilities
and "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination."9
The ADA has five titles. The three main titles are: Title I, which applies to
employment discrimination;1" Title II, which applies to discrimination by public
entities; and Title III, which applies to discrimination by private entities operat-
ing places of public accommodation. 2 The primary focus of this Note is Title III;
however, case law involving section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and all three
titles of the ADA will be examined. Courts often use cases involving the
Rehabilitation Act and Title I of the ADA to interpret Titles II and III because
most of the case law has developed in the context of employment discrimination.1 3
The general rule of Title III is set forth in § 12182(a).14 It states, "No individ-
ual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dation of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.""5 A Title III claim
requires three prima facie elements." First, the plaintiff must meet the ADA's
definition of a person with a disability. Secondly, the defendant must be an
owner, lessee, or operator of a place of public accommodation. 8 Finally, the
defendant must have denied the plaintiff full and equal opportunity to services on
the basis of disability.
1 9
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
9. Id. § 12101(b)(4).
10. Id. §§ 12111-12117.
11. Id. §§ 12131-12165.
12. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
13. Waterstone, supra note 3, at 1495-96 (The article states:
The majority of the body of law that has developed under the ADA has developed within Title I. The courts,
however, have borrowed the decisional principles behind Title I case law in deciding cases under different titles.
* . . Many key components of the ADA are taken directly from section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
Rehabilitation Act cases .... As a result of the legislature's intent for the Rehabilitation Act to serve as an
important guiding role in the ADA, courts have often applied Rehabilitation Act concepts and precedent in
ADA cases.).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
15. Id.
16. Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 E Supp. 1222, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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A. What is a Disability?
An individual seeking accommodation for a disability must first prove that he
or she has a disability as defined by the ADA.2" The statutory definition of a dis-
ability is found in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and applies to all three titles.21 It defines a
disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such an impair-
ment; or being regarded as having such an impairment."22
The phrase "substantially limits" means that the individual is
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.23
"Major life activities" include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing."24 A person diagnosed with a particular disease or condition does not as a mat-
ter of law fit the ADA's definition of "disabled."25 To fall under the statutory defin-
ition, a person must be substantially limited in a major life activity.26 Therefore, the
determination of whether an individual has a "disability" must be based on an indi-
vidualized inquiry.27 Individuals that are not substantially limited in a major life
activity may also fit the ADA's definition of disabled if the covered entity (1) mis-
takenly believes the individual has a disability or (2) mistakenly believes an indi-
vidual with an impairment is substantially limited in a major life activity.
Titles I and II, which apply to discrimination by employers and public entities,
differ from Title III in that Titles I and II grant a cause of action to a "qualified
individual" with a disability; whereas, Title III grants a cause of action to an
"individual" with a disability.29 Under Title III, there is no requirement that the
individual be a "qualified" individual with a disability. According to the ADA,
"The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a dis-
ability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."3
20. Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 2000).
21. Id. at 794.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2) (emphasis added).
23. 29 C.F.R. §1630.20) (2001).
24. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2001).
25. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (holding that corrective measures should
be considered in determining whether a condition is a disability under the ADA).
26. Id. at 493. (The Court determined that the defendant airline company's minimum vision requirement
for its pilots did not, on its face, prove that the defendants mistakenly believed that the plaintiffs were substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working.).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 489-93 (explaining that the statutory definition of "disability" includes "individuals being
regarding as having such an impairment").
29. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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B. What Is a Place of Public Accommodation?
According to House Report 485 concerning the passage of the ADA, "It is
critical to define places of public accommodations to include all places open to
the public, not simply restaurants, hotels, and places of entertainment (which are
the types of establishments covered by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
because discrimination against people with disabilities is not limited to specific
categories of public accommodations."31 Title III of the ADA prohibits entities
that own, lease or operate places of public accommodation from discriminating
on the basis of a disability. 2 Therefore, it is necessary to determine the threshold
question, "What is a place of public accommodation?" The ADA states that the
term "public accommodation" refers to private entities with operations that affect
commerce." It provides a list of private entities that are considered places of
public accommodation "if the operations of such entities affect commerce."34
A "golf course" is one of the many specific places listed as a "public accom-
modation."35 The list includes the following general types of businesses: places
of lodging; establishments serving food or drink; places of exhibition or enter-
tainment; places of public gathering; sales or rental establishments; service
establishments; public transportation stations; places of public display or collec-
tion; places of recreation; places of education; social service establishments; and
places of exercise or recreation. 6
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey 37 demonstrates the breadth of coverage of the ADA. In the
Yeskey case, the Court held that a state prison was a "public entity" within the
meaning of Title II (which applies to government entities), and, therefore, state
prisoners with disabilities are protected by the ADA. 8 The plaintiff, Mr. Yeskey,
had filed suit against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections alleging a viola-
tion of the ADA. 9 Mr. Yeskey had been sentenced to serve eighteen to thirty-six
months in a correctional facility with recommendation for a "boot camp pro-
gram," which could have led to his parole in six months.40 However, Mr. Yeskey
was denied admission into the "boot camp program" because of his medical his-
tory of hypertension. 1 The defendant argued that Congress could not have possi-
bly envisioned that the ADA would apply to prisons. 2
The Court questioned this contention based on the findings of Congress in
enacting the ADA that discrimination existed in critical areas such as "institu-
31. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 35 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 317.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
33. Id. § 12181(7).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. § 12181(7)(L).
36. Id. § 12181(7)(A)-(L).
37. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 212.
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tionalization."" The Court determined that Congress' reference to "institutional-
ization" could have included prisons." The Court stated, "[T]he fact that a statute
can be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.""' The Supreme Court conclud-
ed that state prisons clearly fall within the statutory definition of "public entity"
under Title 1I of the ADA, which includes "any department, agency, special pur-
pose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.""
According to the ADA, private clubs or establishments that are exempt under
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"7 are also exempt under Title III of the
ADA.48 Therefore, it is necessary to examine the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the case law interpreting the Act to determine which private entities are exempt.
The Civil Rights Act also prohibits "discrimination or segregation in places of
public accommodation."" Like the ADA, it applies to "places of public accom-
modation" if the operations of the public accommodation affect commerce."
Unlike the ADA, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a definition of "opera-
tions affecting commerce.""1 According to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, its pro-
visions do not apply to a private club or establishment "except to the extent that
the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or
patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section." 2
Subsection (b) lists establishments that affect interstate commerce. 3 This list
closely resembles the list of public accommodations enumerated in the ADA.54
Subsection (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a test for determining
whether the operations of the listed establishments affect commerce."b For exam-
ple, the operation of an establishment that sells food affects commerce if "it
serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food
which it serves ... has moved in commerce." 6 The operation of a place of exhi-
bition or entertainment affects commerce if "it customarily presents films, per-
formances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which
move in commerce. 57
The Supreme Court applied this test in Daniel v. Paul.8 The Court held that
because a recreational facility's operations affected commerce, the owner and
operator of the facility could not discriminate against black citizens seeking to
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 210 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B) (1994)).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994) (prohibiting discrimination or segregation in places of public accommoda-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin).
48. Id. § 12187.
49. Id. § 2000a (emphasis added).
50. Id. § 2000a(b).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 2000a(e).
53. Id. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4).
54. Compare id. with § 12181(7)(A)-(L).
55. Id. § 2000a(c).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
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participate in the offered recreational activities.5 9 A group of black citizens filed
suit against the owner of Lake Nixon Club alleging a violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.60 The defendant Paul prevented the plaintiffs from joining
his recreational club, 1 which offered swimming, boating, miniature golfing,
dancing, and a snack bar. 2 The lower courts found that the defendant's establish-
ment was not subject to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it was a private
establishment.63 However, the Supreme Court determined that Lake Nixon Club
was subject to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the club's snack bar served
interstate travelers and a substantial portion of the food sold at the snack bar con-
tained ingredients purchased from outside the state."
Similarly, in Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc.," the district court held that because a
golf course's operations affected commerce, the golf course was a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.66 The court
based its decision on three grounds.67 First, the defendant's golf course was
made subject to the Act because the lunch counter on the premises served and
offered to serve the general public including interstate travelers.6" Secondly, as
an alternative ground, the court determined that a golf course falls under the
statutory category of "a place of exhibition or entertainment" and was, therefore,
a place of accommodation under the Act.69 Finally, the court determined that the
operation of the defendant's golf course affected commerce because it allowed an
out-of-state team to use the course annually.
70
Likewise, in Wesley v. Savannah," the court determined that a golf course was
a place of public accommodation. The district court held that a city golf course,
even though leased by a private operator and rented to a private association, was
a place of public accommodation subject to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The
plaintiffs filed suit after they were denied membership in the Savannah Golf
Association on the basis of race and were thereby prevented from participating in
the Association's annual golf tournament, which was played on the city's public
golf course.73 The city leased the golf course to a private operator who in turn
rented the course.74 The defendant argued that its tournaments were not subject
to the Act because of its status as a customer of the lessee.7" The court accepted
59. Id.
60. Id. at 300.
61. Id. at 301-02.
62. Id. at 301.
63. Id. at 300-01 ("[T]he District Court, although finding that the respondent had refused petitioners [sic]
admission solely because they were Negroes, dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lake Nixon Club was
not within any of the categories of 'public accommodations' covered by the 1964 Act. The Court of Appeals...
affirmed .. ")
64. Id. at 305.
65. 261 E Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 476.
69. Id. at 477 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a).
70. Id. (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a).
71. 294 F Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
72. Id.
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that the defendant was a customer of the lessee of the golf course but determined
that a problem was created when the three-day tournament intentionally excluded
black golfers from using the golf course.7 The court concluded that the actions
of the defendant were impermissible because its tournaments were played on the
city's public golf course-a public accommodation under the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 77
C. Who is Protected by the ADA?
Both spectators and participants of entertainment or recreation are protected
from discrimination according to cases interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
For example, in Daniel,78 the Court held that a place of recreation could not dis-
criminate against black citizens seeking to participate in recreational activities.
The defendant, owner and operator of Lake Nixon Club, had attempted to distin-
guish his club from the establishments specifically listed as "places of entertain-
ment" under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78 The defendant asserted that the
establishments enumerated under the Act-theaters, concert halls, and sporting
arenas-involve the patronage of spectators or listeners, not active participants. 80
He argued that, on the other hand, his club offered entertainment that required
active participation such as swimming, boating, miniature golfing, and dancing.8
The Court conceded that the legislative history reveals a focus on spectator
entertainment.84 However, the Court concluded that the statute applied to Lake
Nixon Club based on two grounds.8 First, the club was subject to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because the club's recreational activities are generally consid-
ered forms of entertainment. 4 Secondly, the club was a place of "public accom-
modation" because the club's sources of entertainment moved in commerce."
The paddleboats and jukebox were obtained from outside the state.88 Likewise,
the holdings in Wesley and Evans support that black golfers are protected as par-
ticipants and not merely as observers of a golf tournament.87
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADA's breadth in Yeskey supports
by analogy that the ADA should be interpreted to protect professional golfers
with disabilities from discrimination and segregation.88 In that case, a state pris-
oner with a disability was afforded the protection of the ADA. 9 The defendant
denied the prisoner entry into its boot camp program because of his medical his-
tory of hypertension. The defendant maintained that the text of Title II pro-
76. Id. at 701-02.
77. Id. at 701.
78. 395 U.S. at 298.
79. Id. at 306 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 307.




87. Wesley, 294 E Supp. at 698; Evans, 261 F Supp. at 474.
88. 524 U.S. 206.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 208.
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hibits the denial of "benefits" to an individual with a disability. 1 The defendant
argued that it was not subject to the ADA because state prisons do not offer "ben-
efits" to prisoners. 2 However, the Court determined that modem prisons do offer
"benefits" to prisoners such as recreation, medical services, educational and
vocational programs, and the boot camp program.
9 3
The defendant then argued that a prisoner did not fit the statutory definition
of "a qualified individual with a disability," which is defined as follows:
[one] who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essen-
tial eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participa-
tion in programs or activities provided by a public entity.94
The defendant contended that the terms "eligibility" and "participation"
exclude prisoners because those terms suggest "voluntary" acts and prisoners are
not voluntarily eligible or voluntarily participating in state programs. The
Court rejected this argument because of existing programs such as drug treat-
ment programs for which individuals are "eligible" and do "participate" on an
involuntary basis. 6 Furthermore, the Court noted that prisons do in fact provide
many voluntary services such as libraries and the boot camp program.
97
Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center" is another case that
demonstrates the breadth of coverage of the ADA. In that case, the Third Circuit
held that a staff physician of a hospital could assert a Title III claim against that
hospital. 9 The plaintiff, an orthopedic surgeon, had filed suit against the hospi-
tal after being denied staff privileges allegedly because of his diagnosis of atten-
tion deficit disorder."' The plaintiff had become a staff member of the defendant
hospital in 1973.1 Membership had entitled him to staff privileges, which
included attending patients or providing other diagnostic, therapeutic, teaching or
research services at the hospital. 2 In 1997, the hospital suspended the plaintiff's
medical staff privileges. 3 The plaintiff alleged that his suspension was based on
his 1995 diagnosis of attention deficit disorder.10 4 The hospital argued that the
physician's "unique business relationship" with the hospital precluded him from
maintaining a Title III claim because the coverage of Title III is limited to
"clients and customers." '
91. Id. at 210.
92. Id.
93. Id.




98. 154 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1998).
99. Id. at 122.





105. Id. at 117.
[VOL. 22:71
2002] FATAL FLAW. FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PERSONAL 79
CIRCUMSTANCES OFA PERSON WITH A DISABILITY
On the basis of the plain language of the ADA and the legislative history, the
Third Circuit determined that the phrase "clients or customers" found only in
subsection (b)06 could not serve to limit the broad rule against discrimination
found in subsection (a).0 7 As to whether Title I of the ADA was intended to
apply exclusively to employment situations, the court conceded that it was. 8 Yet,
the court rejected the argument that Title III offered no protection to the plaintiff
because of his "unique business relationship" with the hospital. 9 The court con-
cluded that the plain language of the ADA and the legislative history of Title III
"in no way mentions any sort of 'business relationship' that would preclude an
'individual' from asserting a cause of action if denied the 'full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions of any place of public accommodation."'
110
D. Is an Individualized Inquiry Necessary?
A private entity operating a place of public accommodation is only required to
make modifications that are reasonable, necessary, and do not result in funda-
mental alteration."' Title III defines discrimination as including the following:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or pro-
cedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to indi-
viduals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making
such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations."2
Courts have determined that an individualized inquiry is necessary to determine
whether a modification is reasonable and necessary, while not working a funda-
mental alteration."3
For example, the Second Circuit in Staron v. McDonald s Corp.," ' held that a
case-by-case inquiry is required to determine whether a modification is reason-
able under the ADA. The plaintiffs, three children with asthma and a woman
with lupus, filed suit against McDonald's and Burger King Corporations alleging
that the defendants' smoking policy violated the ADA."' Plaintiffs alleged that
on several occasions they were unable to enter a McDonald's and a Burger King
in Connecticut without experiencing breathing problems because of the tobacco
106. Id. at 118 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv)).
107. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
108. Id. at 118-19.
109. Id. at 121.
110. Id.
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. See Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 E Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that an indi-
vidualized inquiry is essential in achieving the ADA's goal of protecting individuals from discrimination based
on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear).
114. 51 F.3d 353 (2dCir. 1995).
115. Id. at 354.
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smoke-filled air." ' Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants'
smoking policies were in violation of the ADA and an injunction prohibiting
defendants from maintaining a policy in violation of the ADA."7
The Second Circuit determined that the lower court had erred in dismissing
the plaintiffs' claims because a fact specific inquiry was required.118 Although
two lower district courts determined that a smoking ban was an unreasonable
modification, "9 the Second Circuit decided that such a determination must be
made only after an individualized inquiry.12 The court held that the plaintiffs
were entitled to their day in court to prove that a smoking ban or other modifica-
tion would be reasonable in light of their personal circumstances."'
According to House Report 485, "[P]ublic accommodations are required to
make decisions based on facts applicable to individuals and not on the basis of
presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot
do." 22 For example, in Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc.,123 the court held
that a violation of Title III of the ADA occurs when a request for modification is
denied based on an assumed belief about a disability rather that an individualized
inquiry. The plaintiff, a child with spastic diplegia cerebral palsy, filed an action
against defendant Pony Baseball Inc. ("Pony") alleging a violation of the ADA
based on a denial of a request for modification. 24 The plaintiff's father request-
ed that the defendant allow his eleven-year-old son to play in the division for
nine to ten year old players because of his son's medical condition. 25 Even
though the condition severely affected the muscles of the child's lower limbs by
causing them to contract, he could walk, run, and play baseball with the aid of
crutches.1 26 Pony refused the request for modification based on the assumption
of an undue risk to "a child who requires crutches to walk."12' The court con-
cluded that the defendant violated Title III of the ADA in prematurely denying
the requested modification without first examining the personal circumstances of




117. Id. at 355 (The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs' claims based on the conclusion that the
plaintiffs' request for a smoking ban was not a reasonable modification under the ADA.).
118. Id. at 356.
119. Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff
was not entitled to the accommodation of a smoke-free working environment because the plaintiff "could at all
times adequately perform his employment duties"); Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 E Supp. 85, 89 (W.D.
Wash. 1982) (The court found that "the Veterans Administration did make a reasonable effort to accommodate
to plaintiff's handicap while at the same time attempting to accommodate to those who felt the need to smoke
during working hours.").
120. 51 E3d at 356 (The defendants argued that the issue of smoking in restaurants was regulated by the
state and Congress did not intend the ADA to interfere with state policies. However, the court concluded that
violations of the ADA should not be ignored solely because the state provides some protection.).
121. Id. at 358.
122. H.R. RP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 102, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 385.
123. 943 F Supp. at 1222.
124. Id. at 1223.
125. Id. at 1224.
126. Id. at 1223.
127. Id. at 1225.
128. Id.
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1. What Is a Reasonable Modification?
In addition to satisfying the ADA's definition of disabled, a plaintiff must
prove that the requested modification is reasonable and that the defendant denied
the request.129 Once the plaintiff proves that he or she is disabled and that the
request for modification is reasonable, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove, as a defense, that the modification would cause an undue burden or funda-
mental alteration.13 Again, the determination of what is reasonable must be
decided on a case-by-case basis. D 'Amico v. New York State Board of Law
Examiners"' is a case on point. In that case, the district court ruled that "[a]n
individual analysis must be made with every request for accommodations and the
determination of reasonableness must be made on a case by case basis." '132 The
plaintiff filed an action seeking a preliminary injunction to compel the New York
State Board of Law Examiners to comply with her request for modification in
taking the bar exam. 33 The plaintiff experienced poor, dim vision and ocular
fatigue as a result of having marked myopia (nearsightedness) and bilateral par-
tial amblyopia.1 M The plaintiff could not read for extended periods without rest
because her vision would worsen and become blurred, and her eyes would
become watery and burn. 3 The plaintiff failed on her first attempt to pass the
bar exam with accommodations such as a large print exam, a lamp, and addition-
al time. 36 Based on her physician's advice, she requested that the Board permit
her to take the bar exam over four days instead of two.137 The Board refused to
extend the two-day period because it believed that the four-day period would give
the plaintiff an unfair advantage." The Board did offer to provide other accom-
modations, which included additional hours, a taped copy of the exam, and an
amanuensis."'
The court determined that, in this situation, the Board was not the most quali-
fied "to determine what is a reasonable accommodation for an applicant who has
a disability that can only be diagnosed and treated by a physician with significant
experience and expertise.""' The court gave great weight to the treating physi-
cian's opinion because there was no conflicting medical evidence and because
the physician's opinion was not patently outrageous. 41 The court characterized
129. See D'Amico v. NewYork Bd. Of Law Exam'ers, 813 E Supp. 217, 221 (W.D. N.Y. 1993). See also
Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 E3d 1052, 1058-60 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff
alleging discrimination under the ADA has the burden of proving whether a modification is reasonable, while
the defendant has the burden of proving whether the requested modification would result in an fundamental
alteration).
130. Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1058-60.
131. 813 E Supp. at 217.




136. Id. at 218-19.
137. Id. at219.
138. Id. at 219, 221.
139. Id. at 219.
140. Id. at 223.
141. Id.
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the defendant's decision as arbitrary, "unwarranted and ill-advised," and unable
to withstand scrutiny under the ADA.142 The court concluded that the requests
for modification were reasonable and ordered the Board to comply.43
2. What is a Necessary Modification?
A proposed modification must also be necessary. Courts often determine
whether a modification is necessary in conjunction with an analysis as to the rea-
sonableness of a modification. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Vande Zande
v. Wisconsin Department of Administration'" held that "the duty of reasonable
accommodation is satisfied when the employer does what is necessary to enable
the disabled worker to work in reasonable comfort." A woman who was para-
lyzed had sought from her employer numerous accommodations including a
desktop computer for her home (even though she had a laptop) and a lower sink
in the office's breakroom 45 However, the defendant refused the plaintiff's
requests. 4 ' The defendant had in the past made numerous accommodations for
the plaintiff, including modifying bathrooms and purchasing adjustable
furniture.147
The Seventh Circuit determined that the ADA clearly did not require the
employer to provide the plaintiff with a home computer so that she could work
full-time at home and avoid using her sick leave.14s The court also determined
that lowering the sink in the breakroom was unnecessary because plaintiff had
convenient access to another sink.149 The court concluded that there was no dis-
crimination because "the employer made a number of reasonable and some more
than reasonable-unnecessary-accommodations, and turned down only
requests for unreasonable accommodation."' 50
3. What Is a Fundamental Alteration?
According to Title III, private entities operating places of public accommoda-
tion are not required to make modifications that result in a fundamental alter-
ation or an undue burden. 51 While the plaintiff has the burden of showing that a
142. Id. at 222-23.
143. Id. at 223.
144. 44 E3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995); see generally Mary Kate Kearney, The ADA, Respiratory Disease
and Smoking: Can Smokers at Burger King Really Have It Their Way, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 9-11 (2000)
("Costs alone, however, do not determine the reasonableness of an accommodation. For example, the cost of
lowering the kitchen sink on Ms. Vande Zande's floor was only $150.00, but the court still held that the request-
ed change was unreasonable.").
145. 44 F.3d at 545.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 544-46.
148. Id. at 544.
149. Id. at 546.
150. Id.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Discrimination includes "a failure to make modifications ... unless
the entity can demonstrate that making such modification would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations."); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)
(Discrimination includes "a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a
disability is excluded.., unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the
nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an
undue burden.").
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requested modification is reasonable, the defendant has the burden of showing
that the modification would result in a fundamental alteration or undue burden.5 2
In 1979, the Supreme Court first interpreted the meaning of "fundamental alter-
ation" under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis."' The plaintiff, who was diagnosed with bilateral, sensori-
neural hearing loss, was denied admission to the defendant's nursing program
based on the conclusion of the state board of nursing that the plaintiff's hearing
loss made it unsafe for her to care for patients. 54 The plaintiff contended that
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act required the defendant to "dispense with
the need for effective oral communication.' 55  The plaintiff interpreted the Act
and state regulations as requiring the defendant to exempt her from certain
required courses and to provide her with individual supervision from faculty
members when attending patients. 55
The Court characterized the plaintiff's construction of the statute and regula-
tions as involving "substantial" and "extensive" modifications. 57 The Court con-
cluded that such modifications are not imposed by section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act because they would result in a fundamental alteration in the defendant's
nursing program. 8 However, the Court did state:
It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on continuing
past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qual-
ified handicapped persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered
program. Technological advancements can be expected to enhance
opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise to qualify
them for some useful employment. 55
In 1985, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Davis.6 In Alexander v.
Choate,' the Court explained:
We held that the college was not required to admit Davis because it
appeared unlikely that she could benefit from any modifications that the
152. Johnson, 116 E3d at 1058-1060.
153. 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979).
154. Id. at 401-02.




159. Id. at 412.
160. See also Brennan v. Stewart, 834 E2d 1248, 1260-62 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (The court
stated: The Board need not make .'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications" to its licensing requirements,
but "it may be required to made 'reasonable' ones" ... [W]e can no longer take literally the assertion of Davis
that "an otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his
handicap." The question after Alexander is the rather mushy one of whether some "reasonable accommoda-
tion" is available to satisfy the legitimate interests of both the grantee and the handicapped person. And since it
is part of the "otherwise qualified" inquiry, our precedent requires that the "reasonable accommodation" ques-
tion be decided as an issue of fact-meaning, of course, that it is one for the trial court or jury .... ).
161. 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985); (see also Easley v. Snider, 36 E3d 297, 302 (3rd Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen
determining whether an accommodation would allow the applicant to receive the benefit, a court cannot rely
solely on the stated benefits because programs may attempt to define the benefit in a way that 'effectively
denies otherwise handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled."').
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relevant HEW regulations required ... and because the further modifica-
tions Davis sought-full-time, personal supervision whenever she attend-
ed patients and elimination of all clinical courses-would have compro-
mised the essential nature of the college's nursing program .... Such a
"fundamental alteration in the nature of a program" was far more than
the reasonable modifications the statute or regulations required.
Similarly, in Roberts v. Kindercare Learning Centers, Inc.,162 a district court
found that a day-care provider, as a public accommodation under Title III of the
ADA, was not required to provide one-on-one care to a child with a disability.
The child's parents filed an action alleging that the defendant violated the ADA
in accepting the child only when accompanied by a Person Care Attendant
("PCA").163 The four-year old child was developmentally delayed, had limited
communication skills, suffered from seizures, was not toilet trained, and exhibited
behavior problems.1" The child's Individual Education Plan indicated that a PCA
was required to provide him with individualized care.16 The defendant daycare
provider agreed to accept the child on the basis that he would be accompanied by a
PCA, but refused to accept him on the days when a PCA was not available. 6
The court determined that the daycare provider was in the business of provid-
ing group care, not individual care, and to require the defendant to provide indi-
vidual daycare would fundamentally alter the nature of the defendant's service."'
The court also determined that such a requirement would place an undue burden
on the defendant because of the significant expense involved. 8 Therefore, the
court held that the defendant had no legal duty under the ADA or state law to
provide the child with one-on-one care. 69
Again, the issue of fundamental alteration must be decided on a case-by-case
basis. In Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzel Brewery,7 ' another case involving a
Title III claim, the Fifth Circuit held that a modification allowing a guide dog to
accompany the plaintiff on part of the defendant's facility tour would not work a
fundamental alteration in the nature of defendant's business. The defendant
argued that guide dogs on any part of the tour would violate FDA regulations,
would pose a risk of contamination, and would thereby require beer production to
be shut down.171 The defendant maintained that such a modification would fun-
damentally alter the nature of the tour, which was to view the production process
of beer. 72 However, the court affirmed the district court's finding that guide dogs
162. 896 E Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1995); see generally Kearney, supra note 144, at 20 ("[Tihe court
refused to impose such a change because it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the business and would
essentially place the day-care center 'into a child care market it did not intend to enter."').
163. Id. at 925.
164. Id. at 923.
165. Id. at 924.
166. Id. at 925.
167. Id. at 926.
168. Id. at 926-27.
169. Id. at 928.
170. 116 E3dat 1052.
171. Id. at 1064.
172. Id.
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could go on part of the tour without creating a likelihood of contamination and
without violating FDA regulations.173
The defendant also argued that the district court's finding of no fundamental
alteration was erroneous because specific modifications had not been formulat-
ed.17' However, the Fifth Circuit noted that the district court had contemplated
further proceedings in which the defendant was to submit a plan of proposed
modifications that would provide the plaintiff with the "broadest feasible access
consistent with the safe operation of the brewery."'175 The court of appeals stated
that the district court did not have a duty to set forth modifications because the
plaintiff had met the burden of showing that a modification of the defendant's
blanket policy prohibiting guide dogs is reasonable.176 The court concluded that
a modification allowing a guide dog on part of the tour would not result in a fun-
damental alteration 77
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Martin, there was a split in the cir-
cuits as to whether allowing an individual with a disability the use of a golf cart
during a golf tournament would result in a fundamental alteration. While the
Ninth Circuit determined in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc."8 that such a modification
to the rules of golf would not result in a fundamental alteration, the Seventh
Circuit in Olinger v. United States GolfAss 'n1 9 held that the use a golf cart in the
U.S. Open would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. Therefore,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Martin case to resolve
the conflict and, in addition, to decide the "threshold coverage issue" of whether
the ADA applies to professional golf tournaments. 8
III. PGA TouR, INC. v. MARTIN
A. Facts
Respondent Casey Martin entered Q-School, a three-stage golf competition
hosted by petitioner PGA Tour, Inc. ("PGA")."' Q-School was open to any
member of the public who paid the PGA an entry fee of three thousand dollars
and submitted two letters of recommendation from members of the PGA or Nike
Tour. 82 Martin, along with over a thousand other participants, entered Q-School
as a way of qualifying for a spot in the PGA or Nike Tour. 83
Out of more than a thousand contestants, only about 168 participants, includ-
ing Martin, made it to the third and final stage of Q-School 84 These 168 sur-
vivors were guaranteed at least a membership in the Nike Tour because the third
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1064-65.
175. Id. at 1065.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 204 E3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000).
179. 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
180. Martin, 532 U.S. at 674.
181. Id. at 669.
182. Id. at 665-66.
183. Id. at 666.
184. Id.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
stage would determine the top one-fourth who would compete in the PGA
Tour.18 The rules of the PGA permitted golf carts in the first two stages of Q-
School but prohibited them in the third stage.'86 Martin requested permission
from the PGA to use a golf cart in the third stage because, although a talented
professional golf player, he has a disability."7 Martin was born with Klippel-
Trenauny-Weber Syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disorder.188 Because the
progressive nature of the disease had rendered him unable to walk an eighteen-
hole golf course, Martin requested a golf cart and submitted medical records to
support the request. 89 However, the PGA refused to even examine Martin's med-
ical records and denied his request.18 '
B. Procedural History
1. Pre-Trial
Martin filed this action against the PGA alleging a violation of the ADA. 1'
The PGA moved for summary judgment claiming that it was exempt from the
reach of the ADA based on its alleged status as a private club or establishment
not open to the public. 2 In the alternative, the PGA argued that only its areas
open to spectators are places of public accommodation-not the area "behind the
ropes" where the participants play.183 The district court denied summary judg-
ment based on the finding that the PGA is not a private club but is a business
that offers entertainment for the economic benefit of its members and is, there-
fore, subject to the ADA.1"4 The court also determined that the areas where the
golfers play are "places of public accommodation" within the meaning of the
ADA because a "golf course" is specifically listed as a "public accommodation"
in the text of Title 111.195
2. The District Court
At trial, the PGA contended that a waiver of its walking rule to anyone for
any reason would fundamentally alter the nature of its competition.' 9 According
to the PGA, the walking rule was imposed to add the factor of fatigue in its com-
petition.197 The PGA's experts testified that the fatigue from walking the course
affected the outcome of the game, and a player who used a golf cart might have a
competitive edge.198 However, the experts did not address whether the use of a
185. Id.
186. Id. at 667 n.4.
187. Id. at 667-68.
188. Id. at668.




193. Id. at 670.
194. Id. at 669-70.
195. Id. at 670 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L)) ("a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or
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golf cart would result in a competitive advantage to Martin, a person whose med-
ical condition continuously subjected him to extreme fatigue. '99 The PGA main-
tained that "an individualized inquiry into the necessity of the walking rule in
Martin's case would be inappropriate" because such a modification would funda-
mentally alter the competition.0
The district court concluded that it was the duty of the court to look at the
"purpose of the rule" and determine whether a reasonable modification could be
made without fundamentally altering the nature of the game. ' The court
accepted that the purpose of the walking rule was to affect the skill of shot-mak-
ing; however, the court determined that the fatigue resulting from walking was
insignificant. 22 The trial court stated, "The fatigue plaintiff endures just from
coping with his disability is undeniably greater than the fatigue injected into
tournament play on the able-bodied .... To perceive that the cart puts him-
with his condition-at a competitive advantage is a gross distortion of reality."2 3
Therefore, the district court held that allowing Martin to use a golf cart would
not fundamentally alter the competition and entered a permanent injunction
requiring the PGA to allow Martin to use a golf cart.
204
3. The Court of Appeals
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the PGA argued that because the area of the
golf course where the contestants play is opened only to the best golfers and not
the public, the area behind the ropes is not a public accommodation within the
meaning of Title 111.205 However, the court rejected this argument. 0 It reasoned
that even though entrance to the most elite private universities is competitive and
highly selective, the selected students are protected by the ADA because univer-
sities (like golf courses) are defined as places of public accommodation under
Title 111.207
C. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court ruled that because the PGA operates a place of public
accommodation, it must consider the personal circumstances of an individual
with a disability in determining (1) whether a modification is reasonable, (2)
whether it is necessary for the individual, and (3) whether it would fundamental-





203. Martin, 994 E Supp. 1242, 1251-52 (D. Ore. 1998).
204. Martin, 532 U.S. at 672.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 672-673.
207. Id. at 672. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J) ("a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, orpost-
graduate private school, or other place of education") (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) ("a gymnasi-
um, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation") (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 688.
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issues: (1) whether the protection of the ADA extends to a qualified entrant with
a disability competing in professional golf tournaments and (2) whether a quali-
fied entrant with a disability may be denied the use of a golf cart because such
use would fundamentally alter the nature of the tournaments." 9
1. Does the Americans with Disabilities Act Extend to Professional Golfers?
With regard to the first issue, the Court held that a competitor in a golf tour-
nament who has a disability is an "individual" protected by Title III of the
ADA. 1 The Court first determined that the legislative history of the ADA com-
pelled a liberal construction of the text to afford persons with disabilities equal
access to places of public accommodation.211 The Court examined the rule pre-
scribed by Title III of the ADA: "No individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation." '212 The Court determined that Q-School and the
PGA Tours were "privileges" offered by the defendant.212 The Court concluded
that based on the plain terms of the ADA and its interpretation Yeskey, the PGA,
as a lessor and operator of golf courses, could not deny any "'individual'. . . the
'full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations' of those courses. 21 4
2. Are the Golf Courses That Are Leased and Operated by the PGA Public
Accommodations?
Next, the Court examined the definition of "public accommodation" under the
ADA, which specifically identifies a "golf course" as a public accommodation.1
The PGA had maintained that subsection (b) of Title III defines "individual or
class of individuals" as "clients or customers" of the public accommodation.1 6
The PGA reasoned that the golfers are not protected by the ADA because they are
not "clients or customers" but independent contractors who are not covered by the
ADA.217 However, the Court pointed out that the definition of "individual or class
of individuals" as "clients or customers" is expressly limited to subsection (b) and,
therefore, would not apply to the term "individual" found in subsection (a).2"8
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a determination of the proper statutory con-
struction was unnecessary because the $3000 entry fee paid by Martin and the
other entrants qualified them as "clients or customers" of the PGA.
29
209. Id. at 664-65.
210. Id. at 681.
211. Id. at676-77.
212. Id. at 676 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added)).
213. Id. at 677.
214. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 678-79 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv)).
217. Id. at 678.
218. Id. at 679 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) & (b)).
219. Id.
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In addition, the Court determined that the PGA may not discriminate against
either the spectators or the competitors of its tours.22 The Court based this con-
clusion on its decision in Daniel and the decisions of lower courts in Evans and
Wesley.221 These cases held that a "place of exhibition or entertainment" and
commercial golf establishments were prohibited from discriminating against both
spectators and participants .22
3. Does the Use of a Golf Cart by an Individual with an Impaired Walking
Ability Fundamentally Alter Professional Golf Tournaments?
With regard to the second issue, the Court held that a qualified entrant with a
disability in a professional golf tournament may not be denied the use of a golf
cart because such use does not fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA's golf
tournaments. 23 Title III's definition of discrimination provided the basis for the
court's decision.224 It states that discrimination includes the following:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or pro-
cedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to indi-
viduals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making
such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.22
The Court theorized two ways in which a fundamental alteration might occur:
(1) by an alteration of an essential aspect of the game or (2) by an alteration
resulting in an advantage to a person with a disability. 26
a. Does the Use of a Golf Cart by an Individual with an Impaired Walking
Ability Alter an Essential Aspect of Professional Golf Tournaments?
As to an alteration of an essential aspect of the game, the Court observed that
golf carts are not prohibited by the "Rules of Golf" and are routinely used and
even encouraged in the world of golf.22 Moreover, the Court noted that the PGA
does not prohibit the use of golf carts in its open qualifying events, the Senior
PGA Tour, and in certain rounds of the PGA and Nike Tours.228 Therefore, the
Court concluded that walking is not an essential aspect of the game.229 The PGA
attempted to distinguish its tours and the last stage of Q-School from the ordi-
nary game of golf.230 The PGA argued that because its tournament and the last
stage of Q-school was golf played at the "highest level," it was more important at
220. Id. at 681.
221. Id.; Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306; Evans, 261 E Supp. at 477; Wesley, 294 E Supp. at 698.
222. 532 U.S. at 681.
223. Id. at 690.
224. Id. at 681-682 (citing 42 U. S. C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
225. Id. at 682 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
226. Id. at 682-83.
227. Id. at 683-85.
228. Id. at 685-86.
229. Id. at 685.
230. Id. at 686.
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this level than any other for each player to be subjected to the same conditions. 31
The PGA maintained that the fatigue caused by the walking rule has the potential
of determining who wins or loses the game and is, therefore, an essential aspect
of the game."'
The Court rejected this argument based on the impossibility of controlling
other factors that also have the potential of determining the outcome of the game
such as the weather or luck. 33 The Court stated that these factors might even
have a greater effect on the outcome of the competition than the fatigue pro-
duced by walking a golf course."3 The Court also gave weight to the trial court's
finding based on expert testimony that the fatigue from walking a golf course
was insignificant.2 31 In fact, expert testimony had revealed that walking the
course could even result in beneficial effects such as relieving stress, enabling
the body to stay warmer on chilly days, and gaining a better sense of the ele-
ments and the course.3 6
b. Does the Use of a Golf Cart Result in an Unfair Advantage to an Individual
with an Impaired Walking Ability?
As to the use of a golf cart resulting in an advantage to Martin, the Court gave
deference to the district court's finding that Martin "'easily endures greater
fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by walking.'1237 The
Court explained that, even assuming the fatigue induced by the walking rule was
outcome determinate, the petitioner's legal position was fatally flawed because it
refused to consider the personal circumstances of Martin in deciding whether to
accommodate his disability.238 The Court ruled that the clear language and the
purpose of the ADA command that requests for modifications be evaluated in
light of the individual's disability as to whether the requests are reasonable, nec-
essary, or a fundamental alteration.2 9 The Court stressed that an entity like the
PGA cannot deny an accommodation to an individual without first conducting
this individualized inquiry.240 The Court stated, "Congress intended that an entity
like the PGA ... also carefully weigh the purpose, as well as the letter, of the
rule before determining that no accommodation would be tolerable. 241
D. The Dissent
1. Does the Americans with Disabilities Act Extend to Professional Golfers?
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined dissenting, vehemently
opposed the majority's determination that Martin, as a professional golfer, was a
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 686-87.
234. Id. at 687.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 687-88
237. Id. at 690 (quoting Martin, 994 E Supp. at 1252).
238. Id. at 688.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 690-91.
241. Id. at 691.
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"customer" of the PGA.24 The dissent believed that Martin was an "independent
contractor."'243 Therefore, Martin would not be protected by the ADA because
Title I exempts businesses from having to accommodate "independent workers
whose services are contracted for from time to time."2" Justice Scalia stated that
"no one in his right mind" would consider professional baseball players cus-
tomers of the American League or Yankee Stadium.24 By analogy, it was ludi-
crous to consider professional golfers "customers" of the PGA.245
Justice Scalia also attacked the majority's interpretation of Q-School as being
a privilege.247 The dissent contended:
But the Q-School is no more a "privilege" offered for the general pub-
lic's "enjoyment" than is the California Bar Exam. It is a competition for
entry into the PGA TOUR-an open tryout, no different in principle
from open casting for a movie or stage production, or walk-on tryouts
for other professional sports, such as baseball. It may well be that some
amateur golfers enjoy trying to make the grade .... But the purpose of
holding those tryouts is not to provide entertainment; it is to hire.... By
the Court's reasoning, a business exists not only to sell goods and ser-
vices to the public, but to provide the "privilege" of employment to the
public; wherefore it follows, like night the day, that everyone who seeks
ajob is a customer.24
2. Are the Golf Courses that Are Leased and Operated by the PGA Public
Accommodations?
Justice Scalia also vehemently opposed the inclusion of a professional sport
as a "place of public accommodation." '249 He noted that Title III lists "golf
course" as a place of accommodation in the context of being a place of exercise
or recreation.2"' He maintained that the golf courses leased and operated by the
PGA were not used for exercise or recreation but were used by the PGA in the
context of a business offering entertainment.251 Furthermore, the professional
golfers used the PGA's golf courses not for exercise or recreation but as indepen-
dent contractors in the business of selling entertainment.252
3. Does the Use of a Golf Cart by an Individual with an Impaired Walking
Ability Fundamentally Alter Professional Golf Tournaments?
242. Id. at 691-697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 691-95.
244. Id. at 694
245. Id. at 695.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 696-97.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 691.
250. Id. at 696.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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Justice Scalia scoffed at the Court for even considering the "incredibly diffi-
cult and incredibly silly question" of whether walking is fundamental to golf."3
He sarcastically stated the following:
I am sure that the Framers of the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of
King James II of Scotland prohibiting golf because it interfered with the
practice of archery, fully expected that sooner or later the path of golf
and government, the law and the links, would once again cross, and that
the judges of this august Court would some day have to wrestle with that
age-old jurisprudential question, for which their years of study in the law
have so well prepared them: Is someone riding around a golf course
from shot to shot really a golfer?. 4
a. Does the Use of a Golf Cart by an Individual with an Impaired Ability to
Walk Fundamentally Alter an Essential Aspect of Professional Golf?.
Justice Scalia believed that it was foolish for the courts to even entertain the
issue of whether walking was essential to the game of golf.25 He feared that the
majority's decision would change the world of sports and competition, as it is
known. 6 He saw the majority's interpretation of the ADA as meaning, "[E]very-
one gets to play by individualized rules which will assure that no one's lack of
ability (or at least no one's lack of ability so pronounced that it amounts to a dis-
ability) will be a handicap." '257 He offered the following advice: "The lesson the
PGA TOUR and other sports organizations should take from this case is to make
sure that the same written rules are set forth for all levels of play, and never vol-
untarily to grant any modifications. The second lesson is to end open tryouts."2 8
b. Does the Use of A Golf Cart Result in an Unfair Advantage to an Individual
with an Impaired Walking Ability?
Justice Scalia believed that providing Martin a golf cart would be the same as
providing him "a game different ... from that offered to everyone else."2 9 He
noted that the Code of Federal Regulations "states that Title III 'does not require
a public accommodation to alter its inventory to include accessible or special
goods with accessibility features that are designed for, or facilitate use by, indi-
viduals with disabilities."'26 He asserted that Title III does not require a shoe
store to sell only one shoe to a "one-legged person." '261 Therefore, according to
the logic of Justice Scalia, "If a shoe store wishes to sell shoes only in pairs it
may; and if a golf tour (or a golf course) wishes to provide only walk-around
golf, it may."'262
253. Id. at 700.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 700-01.
256. Id. at 705.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 704-05.
259. Id. at 699.
260. Id. at 698 (quoting 28 CFR § 36.307 (2000)).
261. Id. at 699.
262. Id.
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The dissent also attacked the majority's view that luck may have as much
influence on the outcome of the game of golf as the fatigue from walking the
course. Justice Scalia stated that luck is randomly distributed among all the
players, yet allowing Martin a golf cart "gives him a 'lucky' break every time he
plays. ' 2
IV ANALYSIS
A. Does the Americans with Disabilities Act Extend to Professional Golfers?
Are participants in professional golf tournaments "customers" seeking the
privilege to compete and play golf, or are they "independent contractors" seeking
employment? The PGA's Q-School was open to any member of the public who
paid three thousand dollars and submitted two letters of recommendation.64
Therefore, as the majority concluded, Martin was a customer paying for the
"privilege" to compete and play in the PGA's Q-School. As the majority opinion
pointed out in rebutting the dissent, participants in the PGA sponsored tourna-
ments are not comparable to professional athletes such as baseball players
because the golfers do not receive an annual salary.25 The golfers only receive
prize money-if they win.26
The dissent believed that the PGA should not have to accommodate Martin
because he was an "independent contractor" to whom the PGA owed no duty
under Title I of the ADA.26 7 This argument is merely an attempt to create a loop-
hole in the ADA to save the world of sports by denying a person with a disability
access to the competition. Even assuming a "business relationship" could be
construed from Martin's relationship with the PGA, the Third Circuit's decision
in Menkowitz provides support that Title III of the ADA would protect Martin.
2 6
In that case, the Third Circuit held that Title III "in no way mentions any sort of
'business relationship' that would preclude an 'individual' from asserting a cause
of action if denied the 'full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommoda-
tion.' 2 69 If a staff physician is allowed to file a Title III claim against a hospital
even though he is a staff member of that hospital, it follows that Martin, as a pay-
ing member of the defendant's tournament, should be permitted to file a Title III
claim against the PGA.
B. Are the Golf Courses that Are Leased and Operated by the PGA Public
Accommodations?
A golf course is specifically listed under Title III as a public accommoda-
tion. 0 The PGA is subject to the ADA as a lessee and operator of a golf course
263. Id. at 702.
264. Id. at 665-66.
265. Id. at 680 n.33.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 691-95.
268. 154 F.3d at 113.
269. Id. at 121.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L).
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and is prohibited from discriminating against persons with disabilities. The
Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey
confirms the intended breadth of coverage of the ADA. Title II prohibits public
entities from denying "benefits" to individuals with disabilities. If a boot camp
program offered by a state prison to inmates is deemed a "benefit," then, a for-
tiori, golf is a privilege offered by the PGA to Martin.
Justice Scalia conceded that Q-School was open to the public when he
advised the PGA and other sports organizations to end open try-outs. This
advice is in direct conflict with the ADA. The ADA prohibits "eligibility criteria
that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability."
'271 It also
runs counter to one of the goals of the ADA which is to "bring Americans with
disabilities into the mainstream of society 'in other words, full participation in
and access to all aspects of society."'272
House Report 485 emphasized the need for the ADA's definition of public
accommodation to be more expansive than the one in Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and include "all places open to the public ... because discrimination
against people with disabilities is not limited to specific categories of public
accommodations." '273 This is further evidence that Congress intended for the
ADA's definition of public accommodation to extend to the PGA.
According to the ADA, private establishments exempted from coverage under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are also exempted from coverage under the ADA.
Cases interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 refused to exempt from coverage
private entities with operations that affected commerce. Applying the test out-
lined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for determining whether the operations of
an establishment affect commerce, the PGA would not be exempt as a private
club or establishment. The PGA "customarily presents ... athletic teams ... or
other sources of entertainment which move in commerce." '274 Furthermore, cases
interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 such as Daniel, Evans, and Wesley sup-
port the contention that participants of golf are protected from discrimination
just as spectators are. 7 Therefore, not only should the spectators of the PGA
tournaments be protected from discrimination, but also the participants in the
PGA Tours should be protected from discrimination.
C. Does the Use of a Golf Cart Fundamentally Alter Professional Golf
Tournaments?
How can the use of a "golf cart," which is normally used in golf, fundamental-
ly alter the game? Should walking be considered fundamental to the game of
golf? As the majority pointed out, the walking rule is not an indispensable fea-
ture of tournament golf. 2 6 Golf carts are permitted in the Senior PGA Tour, the
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
272. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 35 (quoting Testimony before the House Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, Ser. No. 58, October 11, 1989, p. 192.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 317.
273. Id.
274. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c)(3).
275. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 298; Evans, 261 E Supp. at 474; Wesley, 294 F Supp. at 698.
276. 532 U.S. at 685.
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open qualifying events for petitioner's tournaments, the first two stages of the Q-
School, and the USGA's Senior Amateur championships.2' Also, a player's USGA
handicap index, a qualification score for the U.S. Open, is calculated without regard
to whether the player walks or rides in a golf cart. 78 These facts negate the con-
tention that there should be a blanket prohibition against the use of a golf cart
because of a fundamental alteration in the nature of the PGA's tournament.
1. Does the Use of a Golf Cart by an Individual with an Impaired Walking
Ability Alter an Essential Aspect of Professional Golf Tournaments?
Title III protects a place of public accommodation from having to make
accommodations that would result in a fundamental alteration or an "undue hard-
ship," as does Title L29 Title I defines an "undue hardship" as "an action requir-
ing significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set
forth in subparagraph (B)."28 Subparagraph (B) sets forth factors such as the
nature and cost of the needed accommodation, the financial resources of the
employer, the number of employees, and the type of operation."1 It is unlikely
that Martin could be denied a golf cart based on a "significant difficulty or
expense" analysis.
In Davis and Alexander, the Supreme Court characterized a "fundamental
alteration" as a "substantial" or "extensive" modification that would not benefit
the individual and that would compromise the essential nature of a defendant's
business.282 The plaintiff in Davis was denied modifications because the request-
ed modifications would not have likely benefited her and would have compro-
mised "the essential nature of the college's nursing program.""28 The Martin case
is distinguishable in that the use of a golf cart would benefit Martin and would
not compromise the essential nature of the PGA's tournament. Martin's request
for the use of a golf cart is not a "substantial" or "extensive" modification to the
PGA's golf tournaments in light of Martin's disability.
Martin's request for accommodation is distinguishable from the modification
sought in Roberts Kindercare Learning Centers, Inc.28" In that case, to require a
group daycare provider to provide individual care would have placed an undue
burden on the defendant because of the significant expense and the resulting fun-
damental alteration in the nature of "group" daycare services. Here, the cost of
supplying Martin a golf cart is nominal and, therefore, would not result in an
undue burden. Also, a golf cart, which is routinely used in golf and allowed in
some of the PGA's tournaments, cannot fundamentally alter the nature of the
tournament.
277. Id. at 685-86.
278. Id. at 686 n.44.
279. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (iii); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
280. Id. § 12111(10)(A).
281. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv).
282. Davis, 442 U.S. at 397; Alexander, 469 U.S. at 297.
283. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 413-14).
284. 896 F. Supp. at 921.
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2. Does the Use of a Golf Cart Result in an Unfair Advantage to an Individual
with an Impaired Walking Ability?
Justice Scalia's dissent considered the question, as to whether walking is fun-
damental to golf, to be "incredibly difficult and incredibly silly."28 Although the
question may be difficult, it is hardly "silly" because at stake is the right of an
individual with a disability to be included in the mainstream, free from segrega-
tion and stereotypical assumptions.
According to House Report 485, exclusion of those with disabilities is not
silly. Congress states the following:
The discriminatory nature of policies and practices that exclude and
segregate disabled people has been obscured by the unchallenged equa-
tion of disability with incapacity and by the gloss of "good intentions"...
The social consequences that have attached to being disabled often bear
no relationship to the physical or mental limitations imposed by the dis-
ability. For example being paralyzed has meant far more than being
unable to walk-it has meant being excluded from public schools, being
denied employment opportunities, and being deemed an "unfit parent."
These injustices co-exist with an atmosphere of charity and concern for
disabled people.
Disability does not mean incompetence. The perception that persons
with disabilities are dependent by nature is the result of discriminatory
attitudes, not the result of disability.
286
Martin's record speaks volumes as to his abilities and competence in the game
of golf. Before Martin was fifteen years old, he had won seventeen Oregon Golf
Association junior events.287 As a high school senior, he won the state champi-
onship.28 At Stanford University, his golf team won the 1994 National
Collegiate Athletic Association championship.289 At the professional level,
Martin made the cut to compete in the Nike Tour in 1998 and 1999.290 Based on
his winnings in the 1999 Nike Tour, Martin qualified to compete in the 2000
PGA Tour.81 There was no question that Casey Martin was a qualified and capa-
ble competitor in spite of his disability.
The majority stated the following:
Even if we accept the factual predicate for petitioner's argument-that
the walking rule is "outcome affecting" because fatigue may adversely
285. Martin, 532 U.S. at 700.
286. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 41 (citing Testimony before House Subcomms. on Select Educ. and
Employment Opportunities, Ser. No. 101-51, September 13, 1989, at 78-79), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303,323.
287. 532 U.S. 667-68.
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affect performance-its legal position is fatally flawed. Petitioner's
refusal to consider Martin's personal circumstances in deciding whether
to accommodate his disability runs counter to the clear language and
purpose of the ADA.... [A]n individualized inquiry must be made to
determine whether a specific modification for a particular person's cir-
cumstances as well as necessary for that person, and yet at the same time
not work a fundamental alteration.292
Therefore, the question becomes in light of Martin " personal circumstances,
whether allowing him the use of a golf cart would fundamentally alter the nature
of the PGA tournament. It is important to note that the majority stated the fol-
lowing with regard to the questions of whether a modification is reasonable, nec-
essary, and not a fundamental alteration: "Whether one question should be
decided before the others likely will vary from case to case, for in logic there
seems to be no necessary priority among the three. In routine cases, the fundamen-
tal alteration inquiry may end with the question whether a rule is essential." '293
The PGA argued that the use of a golf cart would fundamentally alter its tour-
nament. Therefore, it took the position that it was not necessary to determine
whether the use of a golf cart was reasonable and necessary in light of Martin's
personal circumstances. While the majority stated that this position was "fatally
flawed,"294 the dissent did not interpret the ADA as requiring an individualized
inquiry.295 However, lower courts have held otherwise and are in accord with the
majority's view. For example, in Staron, even though two lower courts had deter-
mined that a smoking ban was an unreasonable modification, the Second Circuit
held that an individualized inquiry was required to determine whether a smoking
ban was reasonable in the plaintiffs' particular circumstances.296 The courts in
Shultz and D'Amico also interpreted the ADA as requiring an individualized
inquiry.297
Although the dissent believed that the ADA did not warrant an individualized
inquiry, Justice Scalia analyzed the modification as it applied to Martin personal-
ly. He believed that providing Martin a golf cart would be the same as providing
him with a different game. He stated that a golf cart would give Martin a "lucky
break. '299 Rather, according to findings of fact, failing to give Martin a golf cart
could result in an "unlucky break." Medical testimony indicated that Martin's
disease had so weakened the bone in his lower right leg that walking posed a sig-
nificant risk of fracture and/or loss of limb.299
Justice Scalia also analyzed the modification as applied to "disabled persons"
292. Id. at 688.
293. Id. at 683 n.38.
294. Id. at 688.
295. Id. at 702-03.
296. 51 F.3d at 353.
297. Shultz, 943 E Supp. at 1222; D'Amico, 813 E Supp. at 217.
298. 532 U.S. at 702.
299. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1243-44.
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in general. Such an analysis is an example of "stereotypic assumptions" that the
ADA was designed and enacted to prevent.3 0 0 As the court in Shultz recognized
and as House Report 485 stated, "[P]ublic accommodations are required to make
decisions based on facts applicable to individuals and not on the basis of pre-
sumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do."3 1
The ADA itself explicitly protects individuals from such generalized notions by
providing protection for individuals who are merely regarded as having a disabil-
ity.30 2 Justice Scalia believed that the majority's decision would destroy the heart
of sports-competition-by allowing persons with disabilities to play by individ-
ualized rules.30 3 However, this assumption ignores the true spirit and nature of
competition-striving to achieve against the odds. According to President
Theodore Roosevelt, "Our country calls not for the life of case [ease] but for the
life of strenuous endeavor." ' 4
The following words of Dr. Henry Viscardi capture the spirit of Casey Martin
and others with disabilities who pursue their talents and abilities in spite of their
disabilities:
I do not choose to be a common man. It is my right to be uncommon-if
I can. I seek opportunity-not security. I do not wish to be a kept citi-
zen, humbled and dulled by having the state look after me. I want to
take the calculated risk; to dream and to build, to fail and to succeed. I
refuse to barter incentive for a dole.... It is my heritage to stand erect,
prond [proud] and unafraid; to think and act for myself, enjoy the benefit
of my creations and to face the world boldly and say, this I have done.




The holding in Martin reflects society's change in attitude toward individuals
with disabilities in which the ADA has played a major role. Society has come a
long way from the early 1900's when persons with disabilities were viewed as a
social and genetic danger."' In considering the passage of the ADA, two cases
served as examples of the need for the Act. In one case, a court ruled that a child
with cerebral palsy should be excluded from public school because "his physical
300. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (finding that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to society").
301. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 102, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 303, 385.
302. See 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(C).
303. Martin, 532 U.S. at 702-05.
304. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV
387, 392 (1991) (citation omitted).
305. Id. at 392.
306. Stewart R. Hakola & Joseph F. Lavey, Jr., Forty-Three Million Strong: An Overview of Civil Rights
Protections for Persons with Disabilities, 70 MICH. B.J. 548 (1991).
307. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30 (citing 117 CONG. REC. 45974 (1971)), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N 303, 312.
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appearance 'produced a nauseating effect' on his classmates."3"7 In another case,
a woman crippled by arthritis was refused a job at a college because of the belief
that "normal students shouldn't see her."3 8 These cases are appalling to persons
who, because of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA, have had the
opportunity to know people with disabilities as classmates and/or co-workers and
have been inspired by their abilities.
If the opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas had prevailed, society would
have been the loser, not Casey Martin. Martin does not allow his disability to
disable him. However, the opinion of the dissent seeks to further disable those
with disabilities. The opinion of the dissent is fatally flawed in that it is unable to
see, hear or recall the amazing feats of persons with disabilities. Certainly,
according to the analysis of the dissent, hearing and seeing would be considered
fundamental to communicating. Yet, Helen Keller, despite being blind and deaf,
was one of the world's most gifted communicators. Jim Abbott-little league
standout, high school and college baseball star, Olympic gold medallist, and
1989 starting pitcher for the California Angels-was born without a right arm.09
Tom Dempsey, born with a clubbed foot, held the record for the longest field
goal in NFL history for many years. 10 Carl Brashear, despite suffering extreme
prejudices and barriers based on the color of his skin and then based on the loss
of his leg in a naval exercise, persevered and became the first black man and the
first person with only one leg to achieve the elite status of a U.S. Navy master
diver. These persons, like many others with disabilities, are truly individuals
with abilities-the ability to succeed in spite of their disabilities and in spite of
disabling opinions such as the dissent.
The holding in Martin is one step toward the vision of the ADA as expressed
by Sandy Parrino:
Martin Luther King had a dream. We have a vision. Dr. King dreamed
of an America "where a person is judged not by the color of his skin, but
by the content of his character." ADA's vision is of an America where
persons are judged by their abilities and not on the basis of their disabili-
ties.
311
No longer is an individual with a disability viewed as a fatal flaw. Rather, to
hold such an opinion is a fatal flaw.
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